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Abstract  
This article empirically explores the distribution of a Payments for Environmental 
Services (PES) scheme within Mexican forest communities. The PSA-H is a Mexican 
federal PES that has been remunerating communities for forest conservation since 
2003. During the last decade, Mexico’s National Forestry Commission [CONAFOR] has 
developed a complex targeting system in order to enroll forests owned by 
communities with certain socio-economic and ecological characteristics. In the present 
study we analyze the socio-economic characteristics and land use changes of recipients 
of the PSA-H to understand how the targeting objectives have been expressed in the 
field. We conducted a combined survey of 47 ejidos and 163 households in the south of 
the state of Yucatan – the Cono Sur region. We first investigate, at the ejido-level, what 
determines the unequal distribution of payments. Second, we analyze the amount of 
payment received depending on the characteristics of households. Our analysis shows 
that the way the PSA-H is being distributed by ejidatarios bypasses the initial 
compensation objective. As a matter of fact, the distribution of the payments reflects 
past land use trajectories. 
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1. Introduction 
Payments for environmental services (PES) are innovative forest conservation instruments that 
have developed extensively during the last decade (Engel et al. 2008). But a fierce debate remains 
about their objectives. According to Wunder’s definitions (Wunder 2005, 2015), PES are a direct 
application of Coase theorem and, to be environmentally effective, PES must demonstrate 
additionality and focus on credible threats of deforestation (Wunder, 2007). Therefore, they should 
focus on threatened forests and compensate landowners for the foregone income.  
This vision of PES has been criticized by many authors because it ignores the institutional 
process behind the emergence of PES. In reality, PES are shaped by local institutions (Muradian et 
al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2013) and existing regulations (Brimont et Karsenty, 2015) and often do 
not look like a pure Coasean agreement (Vatn, 2010; 2015). PES as a compensation are exceptions to 
a polluters-pays principle and can be seen as illegitimate and unfair if it only remunerates 
landowners that are willing to deforest. Making the scheme acceptable and effective on the long-run 
often requires better considering equity and legitimacy in the attribution of payments (Adger et al., 
2003; Corbera et al., 2007; Pascual et al, 2014) and PES following a compensation logic are unlikely 
to emerge. 
The PSA-H is a PES scheme to protect watershed services run by the Mexican federal 
government (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Alix-Garcia et al., 2012). In order to conserve the forest 
cover, the PSA-H offers five year contracts with yearly payments, which are proportional to the area 
of forest under conservation. The Mexican forest commission, CONAFOR, has developed a complex 
targeting system in order to focus its intervention (Rolon et al., 2011; Muñoz Piña et al., 2011) on 
threatened forest in order to maximize additionality. 
In Mexico, 80% of the forest cover is owned as commons by communities called ejido
1
. (Bray et 
al., 2003; Kaimowitz, 2005) and a great share of the scheme does not allocate payments to individual 
landowners but rather to the assembly of each ejido. This assembly then decides how to use the 
payments and how to redistribute them. The final allocation depends crucially on the community 
sharing rules. 
                                                          
1
 We use in this paper the term ejido in the sense of nucleo agrario i.e. that encompass the agrarian 
communities 
Études et Documents n° 28, CERDI, 2015 
 
5 
 
In this article, we analyze the distribution of the payments within the ejidos in order to 
understand how the objectives of the PSA-H are understood and whether the internal distribution 
complies or conflicts with the logic of economic compensation. In particular, we study how land-use 
heterogeneity impacts PSA-H redistribution. Within ejidos, the ejidatarios
2
 perform different 
economic activities that can rely more or less on the availability of forestland to be put into 
agricultural production. Does the land-use practices affect inequality in payments redistribution? 
Who are the final beneficiaries? Studying the interaction between land-use practices and 
redistribution of the PSA-H within the ejidos allows us to understand how the program's objectives 
may have been appropriated by the ejidos. We explore this issue in a sub-region of Mexico’s 
Yucatan state. Within the ejido different types of land users whose production activities rely more or 
less on clearing of the forest cover coexist. We show that inequality in payment allocation tends to 
be linked to the agro-economic profile of the ejidatarios with cattle ranchers being less prone to 
receive payments compared to subsistence and sedentary agriculture farmers. Therefore, past 
trajectories and the current dependence on clearing are the main determinants of the amount of 
payments received. 
The next section presents the PSA-H and its targeting system and discusses payment repartition 
within the ejidos. Section 3 presents the Cono Sur of Yucatan and the methodology employed. 
Finally Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis regarding payment redistribution in 
the Cono Sur sampled ejidos. 
 
2. The PSA-H in Mexico : targeting and distribution modalities. 
The PSA-H is a federal scheme of payments for hydrological environmental services whose 
objective is to create a financial incentive to conserve the forest in over-exploited aquifers (Muñoz-
Piña et al., 2008). Can it be considered as a compensation mechanism? This section discusses this 
interrogation from the conception of the PSA-H to its implementation at various scales and in 
                                                          
2
 Within the ejido, the membership is defined in regards to three statuses: ejidatarios, posesionarios and 
avecindados. Only ejidatarios have a voting right at the assembly. Ejidatarios and posesionarios have rights to 
parcelised land and a share of commons contrary to the avecindados. In our sample, most ejidos have been 
recently formed and there are very few posesionarios and no avecindados. For this reason, our sample is 
composed at 99% of ejidatarios and we use the term ejidatarios is used for all surveyed households. 
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particular within the ejidos
3
. 
2.1. Targeting of the PSA-H 
As highlighted by Shapiro-Garza (2013) and McAfee and Shapiro (2010), interactions with civil 
society and other stakeholders, such as NPA commissions, forced CONAFOR to consider multiple 
objectives. These interactions tended to hybridize the programme into a multiple objectives scheme 
targeting not only toward threatened forests but also marginal areas. Studying allocation rules of the 
program, one can distinguish three types of criteria: administrative, marginality and environmental 
priority. Sims et al. (2013) showed that, through adaptive management of the selection criteria, the 
PSA-H succeeded in combining both objectives. We here focus on environmental priority. We will 
show in the forthcoming section that, despite the hybridization, CONAFOR conceived the PSA-H as 
a compensation instrument to protect threatened forests. 
According to CONAFOR's rules, the primary objective of the PSA-H and the PSA-CABSA is to 
"offer payments for environmental services generated by forest ecosystems
4
" (CONAFOR, 2009). 
Rural development only appears as one of many objectives of Proarbol "through valorisation, 
conservation and sustainable exploitation of forest resources
3
". 
Every year, CONAFOR defines eligibility zones based on land-use change maps, advice and 
propositions from regional offices and a deforestation risk index. The eligibility zones are defined as 
"areas or forest ecosystems where the degradation process endangers biodiversity and environmental 
services
5
" (CONAFOR, 2009). The deforestation risk index is computed by the Instituto Nacional de 
Ecologia y Cambio Climatico (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008). It predicts, at the pixel-level, the risk of 
deforestation based on past deforestation trends, agro-ecological characteristics and socio-economic 
variables
6
. Figure 1 shows the evolution of eligibility zones between 2004 and 2012 which have been 
widely enlarged since 2003 and now cover about a quarter of the Mexican territory
7
.  
Only eligible ejidos can apply for the scheme. Every year, CONAFOR receives new applications 
for the scheme and ranks these applications according to predefined ranking criteria. Because of 
                                                          
3
 The beneficiaries of the PSA-H can be private landowners as well as communities, the first ones represented 
one third of the contracts signed in 2005 (Munoz-Pina et al., 2008, table1) 
4
 Translation by the authors 
5
 Translation by the authors 
6
 See Muño-Piña et al., (2008) for more details regarding the econometric analysis 
7
 Authors’ calculations based on data provided by CONAFOR 
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budget constraints, only the highest ranked ejidos are accepted into the programme (Rolon et al., 
2011). The deforestation risk index is also part of the ranking criteria together with other 
environmental indicators such as soil degradation, over-exploitation of aquifers or water availability, 
among others (CONAFOR, 2009). Beneficiaries commit to avoid land-use change for five years in 
the area of forest enrolled, and receive, in return yearly payments proportional to the area of forest 
enrolled. 
Eventually, the amount of payments allocated per hectare of forest enrolled varies according to the 
deforestation risk index. Originally, the payments were set at the average income that could be 
obtained from one hectare of maize in order to reflect the opportunity costs of one hectare of forest 
(Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008). The payments were later diversified per type of forest and deforestation 
risk to capture OC heterogeneity. The amounts of payments are presented in Table 1. 
The above elements tend to show that CONAFOR conceived the PSA-H as a compensation 
mechanism as it targets threatened forest and as the amount of payments are intended to reflect 
income loss attributable to conservation. As highlighted above, interactions with civil societies and 
other groups of interest forced CONAFOR to consider other conceptions of PES and integrate new 
objectives. This hybridization may be responsible for the low additionality observed in the early 
cohorts of beneficiaries (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Muñoz Piña et al., 2011; Alix-Garcia et al., 
2012). Nevertheless, Sims et al. (2013) highlight that, through adaptive management of the 
targeting criteria, the designers succeeded over time at combining both objectives. 
Figure 1: Evolution of eligible areas (Source : Authors) 
  
 
 
 
  
Études et Documents n° 28, CERDI, 2015 
 
8 
 
Table 1: Area of payments 
  Forest type  
Deforestation 
risk Payment 
Area 1 Bosque Mesofilo Very high 1.100 Pesos per Ha (84 USD) 
Area 2 Bosque Mesofilo Low to high 700 Pesos per Ha (53 USD) 
Area 3 
Bosque de coniferas, selva 
subcaducifolia and bosque 
de encino 
Very low to very 
high 550 Pesos per Ha (42 USD) 
Area 4 Selva alta perennifolias 
Very low to very 
high 382 Pesos per Ha (29 USD) 
 
Note: Conversion in USD made using 2010 exchange rate (1USD = 13 Mexican pesos) 
Source: CONAFOR, 2009 
 
2.2. Appropriation of the PSA-H by the ejidos 
In Mexico, 80% of the forests are owned by ejidos (Bray et al., 2003; Kaimowitz, 2005). This 
unique figure is the result of one century of agrarian reforms spanning from the Mexican revolution 
in the early 20th century to the second agrarian reforms, called PROCEDE, that took place during 
the 1990's (De Janvry et al., 2001; Muñoz-Piña et al., 2003). Within the ejidos, each ejidatario owns 
a private parcel, with complete or incomplete property rights and a share of the commons. In 1992, 
PROCEDE gave ejidos the opportunity to redefine their commons and obtain formal property rights. 
Although PROCEDE led to a vast privatization of lands, however most of the forest is formally 
owned as commons managed by the assembly. 
As emphasized by Corbera et al. (2009), since the forest is owned as commons, PES does not 
directly remunerate households or individual landowners but rather ejidos.Once enrolled, the ejido 
can decide to redistribute the payments among its members, to invest in public goods (roads, school, 
new income generating activities etc…), or remunerate labor related to activities promoted by the 
program such as patrolling into the forest or building firebreak. This last use of PSA-H payments has 
been found in other Mexican States but, in our sample in Yucatan, excepting minor collective 
investment, all the payments were redistributed among the ejidatarios. 
In Chiapas, multiple authors showed that participation and distribution of the payments within the 
community was not egalitarian and tended to reflect existing power relationships within the 
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community (Garcia et al., 2010; Hendrickson and Corbera, 2015). Our studies complete these results 
with an emphasis on the type of land-use and the logic of the distribution rules. 
In order to understand how the ejidatarios share the payments, we need to clarify the internal 
negotiation process taking place. As explained above, the governance of the ejido relies mainly on 
the decisions made at the assembly of ejidatarios which are composed of families with different 
community-related historic backgrounds. Reaching an agreement at the assembly to enroll in the 
PSA-H does not necessarily mean that all ejidatarios choose to enroll in the programme. The 
assembly can agree to enroll part of the forest and decide that only the ejidatarios willing to 
participate are eligible to receive payments. On the contrary, non participants can ask to exclude 
another part of the common forests from the programme. If the per hectare amount of payment is 
constant within the same agro-ecological zone (Table1), the potential amount received per ejidatario 
will therefore depend on this negotiation process and vary from an ejido to another. 
In the Cono Sur region of Yucatan, we observed three meaningful examples of the distribution rules 
which vary over time and between ejidos but are often a combination of these three examples. A first 
distribution rule consists in dividing all the payments equally among the ejidatarios. Here, 
remuneration is not directly linked to the dependence on forest clearing, some ejidatarios use the 
commons more than others. Nevertheless, since all of them have land-use rights and voting rights at 
the assembly, they receive equal payments. Another rule is to divide the payments, not equally 
among each member, but rather inversely proportional to the share of common forests they have 
cleared. Each ejidatario owns an equal share of commons and therefore an equal share of the 
common forest. This forest cover can be converted to agricultural fields or pasture for personal use 
with the permission of the assembly. The more the ejidatario has converted of his share of forest, the 
less PES remuneration he receives. A last example of a distribution rule involves sharing payments 
but only among a certain group of ejidatarios willing to participate. The ejidatarios that do not wish 
to join the programme are either those who were absent during the assemblies or those who want to 
keep their share of forest out of the programme. The latter, often cattle-ranchers, do not join either 
because they consider that payments are not high enough or because they feel that environmental 
programs threaten their activities. 
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The objective of CONAFOR was to target threatened forests and compensate the agents that 
deforest. However, this logic is not found in any these three allocation rules. In the next sections, we 
will further analyze the distribution of the payments within the ejidos in order to understand whether 
the internal distribution complies or conflicts with compensation logic. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Study area and survey methodology 
The Cono-Sur is located at the south of Yucatan State between the states of Campeche and 
Quintana Roo and concentrates most of the PSA-H contracts of the State (Fig.2). The area has 
known several periods of large deforestation, especially during the late 1970's and 1980's. During 
this period, public policies such as PRONADE (a national clearance programme) offered subsidies to 
clear land and establish mechanised agriculture. Whilst deforestation slowed down in the 1990's with 
the end of PRONADE and, more generally, with the reduction of state supports to agriculture, it 
remains an important matter of concern. Cattle-ranching, and to a lesser extent traditional slash-and-
burn agriculture, are the main sources of deforestation in the area. 
Ejidos from the southern part of our study zone lack basic infrastructure such as roads, running 
water and electricity and have been partly deserted by the population. This has led to the formation 
of labor-ejidos where ejidatarios maintain economic activities but live in the nearest city. In our 
sample, about 45% of the households do not live in their ejido. The average size of an ejido in our 
sample is about 2,500 ha and the average number of ejidatarios is 75. 
Figure 2: The Cono Sur of Yucatan 
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Our sample is composed of 47 ejidos receiving the PSA-H out of the 77 eligible ejidos in 2012. 
They constitute a quasi-exhaustive sample of all of the Cono Sur. At the ejido level, we conducted 
participatory surveys with the authorities and with ejidatarios willing to participate. The surveys 
explored land-use, household economic activities, governance, and infrastructure and PSA-H 
payment distribution, among other criteria. 
The repartition of the 47 ejidos regarding the first year of reception of the PSA-H is presented in 
Table 2. Note that ejidos can cumulate PSA-H contracts by enrolling new forest areas and apply to 
enroll again the same area at the end of the five year contract. Yearly payments allocated to the 
ejidos vary from 3,500 to more than 93,000 Mexican pesos (300 USD to more than 7,000 USD). 
There are on average 44 ejidatarios in each ejido for a superficies of 2,350 ha. Common forests 
cover on average 64% of the ejidos and measures 1,600 ha.  
 
Table 2: Number of ejido contracting PSA-H per year of first reception  
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Nb ejido 1 6 0 20 2 7 4 6 1 
 
At the household level, the sample size could not exceed 200 households and for logistical 
reasons it was impossible to conduct household surveys in all the ejidos. We randomly selected 25 
beneficiary ejidos and checked the representativity of this sample regarding demography, PSA-H 
payments and economic activities. Surveying 200 households corresponded to 20% of the total 
number of ejidatarios, with a maximum limit of 15 households and a minimum limit of 5 households 
per ejido
8
. Once we excluded outliers and the households from non beneficiary ejidos that were not 
relevant for this study, our sample was composed of 163 households. The household survey allowed 
deeper investigation of land user profiles and reception of the PSA-H. 
Among those 163 households, 151 declared that they had received payments from the PSA-H. 
The average households’ size is 4.8 members. The household’s head is on average 54 years old and 
22% of them do not know writing and reading. 
                                                          
8
 The number of ejidatarios varies widely and the results regarding the distribution of the PSA-H within the 
ejidos would have been biased by the decisions made by larger ejidos 
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Total payments received per ejidatario between 2005 and 2013 range from 3,000 to 180,000 
Mexican pesos (230 to 13,850 USD). Most of this heterogeneity is explained by the fact that some 
ejidos have only received the programme for one year whilst others participated during the entire 
period of analysis. Nevertheless, if on average the ejidatarios received around 10,000 Mexican pesos 
(770 USD) per year of reception, this amount varies between 600 and 34,000 per ejidatarios (46 to 
2,615 USD). 
 
3.2 Land uses and distribution rules: hypothesis and descriptive statistics 
3.2.1. Three land use practices 
There are three main land use practices in the area, often combined by the ejidatarios: 
 Traditional slash-and-burn agriculture: Shifting cultivation of maize inter-cropped with 
beans is the traditional form of agriculture called milpa. In our sample, traditional producers 
cultivate 2 hectares on average. Producers shift parcels every two or three years and fallow 
periods last for 10 to 15 years. Yields that can be obtained from this activity remain low and 
vary according to the climatic conditions and the use of inputs (from 0.6 t/ha/year to 1 
t/ha/year). Being poorly profitable, traditional agriculture tends to be abandoned or is 
maintained in combination with other activities such as cattle and off-farm activities. In our 
sample, 50 ejidatarios implemented milpa in 2005 and 47 in 2013.  
 Mechanised agriculture: This form of intensive non-rotative agriculture developed in Cono 
Sur in the late 1970's with the implementation of PRONADE. The area under cultivation in 
our sample varies from 1 to 22 hectares. The yields that can be obtained are three to four 
times superior to those obtained by slash-and-burn if combined with an irrigation system. . 
In our sample, 81 ejidatarios engaged in this type of activity in 2005 and 85 in 2013.  
 Cattle-ranching: The Cono Sur is also a traditional cattle-ranching area. In our sample, 30% 
of ejidatarios have at least one head of cattle but some of them only breed a few heads at 
home for savings or short-term profit. More than 20% of our sample have individual 
pastures or use common pasture and forest for grazing. In our sample, 29 ejidatarios 
engaged in cattle-ranching activities in 2005 and 41 in 2013.  
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These land uses yield heterogeneous returns and depends more or less on forest clearing. Although 
mechanized agriculture is the most profitable form of agriculture, cultivating new land requires high 
investment in land-leveling. Most producers cannot afford this investment and they are not directly 
dependent on the forest cover, at least in the short-run. Moreover, they mainly cultivate on individual 
parcels. On the opposite, traditional producers cultivate very small areas with moderate, it cannot be 
considered in our region as the main source of deforestation since this activity is decreasing since 
several decades (personal communication with Luis Arias and Luis Dzib). Moreover, as 
highlighted by Borrego and Skutsch (2014), if fallow period are long enough, this type of agriculture 
is likely to be sustainable. In Jalisco, the authors also showed that the highest return on clearing 
activities were obtained by cattle ranchers and that, land cleared for pasture is larger than for 
traditional agriculture. Cattle-ranchers also are the main agents that deforested in the past in Cono 
Sur. Therefore, in line with the objective of the PSA-H to target the agents that deforest, CONAFOR 
may be willing to target cattle-ranchers in order not to remunerate windfall effects and avoid 
deforestation. However the redistribution within the ejido may result in a completely different 
allocation.  
 
3.2.2. Land uses and PES distribution: Descriptive statistics  
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the Gini coefficient of inequality for the distribution of 
payments in the 47 ejidos according to the presence of the three main land use practices in the ejido. 
Calculations of the Gini are based on the total amount of payments received by each ejidatario in the 
47 ejidos that received payments between the beginning of the PSA-H and 2012. We note that the 
presence of cattle-ranching in the ejido tends to be associated with more unequal distribution. This 
pattern seems less marked with mechanized and traditional agriculture. 
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Figure 3: PSA-H distribution inequality and type of activities (ejidal level) 
  
 
 
At the household-level, Figure 4 presents the yearly amount of payments received by the 163 
ejidatario surveyed according to the three types of land use: mechanized agriculture, cattle-ranching 
and traditional slash-and-burn. The land use can be impacted by the PSA-H so we use activities in 
2005, before PSA-H reception, to avoid endogeneity. Moreover, we use the average reception per 
year because the total amount is highly influenced by the year of entry of the ejido, making irrelevant 
the comparison between households of different ejidos. According to Figure 4, the ejidatarios who 
practiced mechanised agriculture tended to receive more payments, whilst ejidatarios who practiced 
cattle-ranching received less. This is probably due to the fact that mechanized producers were able to 
conserve larger areas of forests over the years contrary to cattle ranchers. 
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Figure 4: PSA-H yearly payments and type of activities (household level) 
 
 
 
Note that the amount of payments received by the ejidatarios depends on the amount received by 
their ejido. In order to analyze the distribution of the payments, it is crucial to compare the amount of 
payments received by one ejidatario, not with the amount received by the entire sample, but by the 
other ejidatarios living in the same ejido. In the econometric analysis presented in the following 
section, we use a panel structure to capture between-ejido heterogeneity and focus on within-ejido 
heterogeneity. 
 
3.3. Model 
This section proposes an empirical analysis of the repartition of payments within the ejido. The first 
section of this econometric analysis investigates the determinants of inequality in payment 
distribution at the ejido-level. The second section explores the determinants of the yearly amount of 
payments received by one ejidatario compared to its peer. 
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3.3.1. Distribution inequality among beneficiary ejidos  
We explore the determinants of inequality of payment distribution within the ejidos. We estimate an 
OLS model with the Gini index of payment distribution between 2003 and 2012 as our explained 
variable. Our hypothesis is that inequality in distribution is directly linked to land-use heterogeneity 
within the ejido. Given that the Gini index range from 0 to 1, we use an arc-sinus functional form 
(Chen, 1990) and estimates the following model: 
arcsin⁡(√𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗) = ⁡α⁡ + ⁡β𝐿𝑗 ⁡+ ⁡γ𝑋𝑗 ⁡+ ⁡ε⁡j    (1) 
In equation 1, Lj corresponds to the different land use in ejido j as presented in Section 4.2.1. We use 
the 2005 level of each variable in order to avoid endogeneity. In a first step, we consider dummy 
variables if mechanised agriculture (mec05_ejid), traditional agriculture (trad05_ejid) and cattle-
ranching (ranch05_ejid) are implemented in the ejido. In a second step, we introduce the percentage 
of ejidatarios implementing each activity (per_mec05, per_trad05 and per_ranch05). Xj includes 
control variables likely to influence inequality such as number of ejidatarios, average participation to 
the assembly, area of forests in hectare and percentage of total common lands in the ejido. We also 
include a dummy variable for labour-ejido defined as the ejido with less than 20 inhabitants. 
 
3.3.2. Within ejido heterogeneity: payments at the household level 
Our hypothesis is that PES distribution tends more to reflect past trajectories than to compensate 
foregone benefits. We test this hypothesis using a panel. The panel is structured with two 
dimensions: ejido and households. The panel estimation allows us to capture between-ejido 
heterogeneity and focus on within-ejido heterogeneity, i.e. the difference of payments received by 
one ejidatario compared with other ejidatarios from the same ejido. We test the impact of the type of 
land use implemented by the ejidatario before PSA-H implementation on the amount of PSA-H 
received. 
We estimate the following models with fixed effects (2): 
𝑝𝑠𝑎ℎ𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 ⁡= ⁡α⁡ + ⁡β𝐿𝑖𝑗 ⁡+ ⁡γ𝑋𝑖𝑗 ⁡+ ⁡η𝐷𝑗 ⁡+ ⁡εij    (2) 
In equations 2, psahyearij corresponds to the average yearly amount of payments received by 
ejidatario i in ejido j during one year of reception. Some ejidatarios joined the programme several 
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years after the others programme either due to absence from the ejido or a reluctance to participate at 
the program’s onset. For this reason, we chose to use average yearly payments rather than total 
payments. 
As in estimation (1), we use the level of the variables in 2005 in order to avoid endogeneity. Three of 
these variables are linked to land-use: (mec05_hhij), (trad05_hhij) and (ranch05_hhij) respectively for 
mechanised agriculture, traditional slash-and-burn and cattle ranching. We consider as cattle 
ranchers only households using either pasture or common land for grazing. We also include one 
dummy variable to control for permanent off-farm activity. Xij include control variables such as the 
size of the household and a measure of the assets computed using principal component analysis. 
Eventually, we include a dummy variable equals to one if the ejidatario is a member of the ejido 
authorities, a producer organization and the average percentage of assemblies in which he 
participated. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. At the ejido level 
Table 3 presents the results for the estimation of equation 1 on the sample of the 47 beneficiary 
ejidos. Column (1) presents the results of the estimation with only the control variables. Column (2) 
adds dummy variables for each activity and column (3) percentage of ejidatarios implementing each 
activity. Comparing the R-squared of column (1) with columns (2) and (3), we note that considering 
the type of land-use in the estimation adds to the explanatory power of the model. 
As suggested by the box-plots presented in Figure 3, the presence of cattle ranching seems to 
increase distribution inequality. According to the results of column (3), the more cattle ranchers there 
are in the ejido, the more unequal is the distribution. Our results also suggest the opposite results for 
mechanised agriculture. The more ejidatarios with mechanised plots, the less unequal is the 
distribution. Our results also suggest that the distribution has been more equal in the ejidos with 
higher participation rate at the assembly.  
This result suggests that inequality in payment distribution is linked to the agricultural profile of the 
ejido. As a matter of fact, whilst ejidos relying on mechanised agriculture tend to have more equal 
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rules of allocation, the ejidos involved in cattle ranching have more heterogeneity in individual 
payments. Nevertheless, these results do not tell us who benefits more from the programme. In the 
next section, we study the amount received by each ejidatario according to their land use. 
 
4.2. At the household level  
Table 4 presents the results of the econometric analysis regarding distribution of the payments 
using the sample of the 163 recipient households. Columns (1) present the results of the estimation 
of the model presented in equations 2. The coefficient estimates for our three main variables of 
interest, mec05_hh, trad05_hh and ranch05_hh, are all significant. The main beneficiaries were the 
ejidatarios who engaged in mechanized activities and traditional agriculture. Producers with cattle-
ranching activities received less payment than others. 
Our results are robust in many settings. Column (2) excludes from the sample the ejidatarios that 
decided to remain outside of the programme. Columns (3) and (4) displays the results using the total 
amount of payments received rather than average yearly payments respectively with the whole 
sample and excluding the ones that decided to remain outside of the programme. Our variables of 
interest remain significant in all specifications, which confirm the robustness of our results. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
This article explores the distribution at the community and household levels of the PSA-H, a 
Mexican PES created in year 2003. CONAFOR tried to design the PSA-H as a compensation 
instrument by targeting threatened forest. However, since most of the Mexican forests are commons, 
PES payments are allocated to communities called ejidos, and the assembly of each ejido divides 
payments among the ejidatarios according to their own rules and perception of fairness. Based on 
ejido and household surveys in a sub-region of Yucatan State, we explore the interaction between the 
land-use practices and internal payment redistribution. In our study area, cattle ranchers are the 
agents that deforested more common forests in the past, they are the main agents to target in order to 
achieve additionality.   
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Table 3: Inequality in payments distribution at ejido-level 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES gini gini gini 
    mec05_ejid 
 
-0.1939* 
 
  
(0.1071) 
 trad05_ejid 
 
0.0104 
 
  
(0.0978) 
 ranch05_ejid 
 
0.2681** 
 
  
(0.1010) 
 per_mec05 
  
-0.2441 
   
(0.1716) 
per_trad05 
  
-0.0934 
   
(0.1521) 
per_ranch05 
  
0.4995** 
   
(0.1868) 
Ejidatarios -0.0013 -0.0022* -0.0012 
 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Forest 2005 
(Ha) 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Assembly 
participation -0.5919** -0.5394* -0.6193** 
 
(0.2567) (0.2686) (0.2553) 
% Commons -0.2874** -0.3623*** -0.3113** 
 
(0.1186) (0.1247) (0.1284) 
Labour-ejido -0.1049 -0.0915 -0.1229 
 
(0.0967) (0.1102) (0.1057) 
Constant 1.1671*** 1.0701*** 1.1833*** 
 
(0.2066) (0.2207) (0.2195) 
    Observations 47 47 47 
R-squared 0.2454 0.2970 0.3119 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Distribution of the payments within ejidos 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES psahyr psahyr psahtot psahtot 
     mec05_hh 3.5699** 2.9309** 14.3650* 12.4988 
 
(1.4728) (1.2990) (8.0749) (8.3852) 
trad05_hh 2.8864** 3.0168** 15.0109** 16.1110** 
 
(1.0915) (1.2050) (6.5327) (7.3033) 
ranch05_hh -1.6087** -1.7637** -6.7567* -7.4813* 
 
(0.6782) (0.7243) (3.8242) (3.8947) 
Off-farm in 2005 1.0509 0.4371 7.3072 5.2664 
 
(1.0027) (0.9260) (4.6444) (4.8150) 
Household size in 2005 -0.0300 0.1195 -0.1383 0.6230 
 
(0.1903) (0.1614) (1.0875) (1.0567) 
Asset index in 2005 1.4733 2.0509 9.6924 17.0019 
 
(3.0285) (2.0526) (15.6316) (12.4851) 
Assembly participation 1.6631 -0.9907 7.2754 -5.4178 
 
(1.8753) (1.2386) (6.6840) (5.6671) 
Ejido’s authorities 1.6577 0.5970 5.4999 -0.3387 
 
(1.1905) (0.8219) (5.8846) (4.6936) 
Producer organization -0.0804 0.1860 2.6979 4.4169 
 
(0.7211) (0.6813) (5.0268) (5.1885) 
Constant 5.5486*** 7.6583*** 26.3508** 34.5779*** 
 
(1.6327) (1.6221) (9.6076) (10.7311) 
     Observations 163 151 163 151 
R-squared 0.1872 0.1705 0.1378 0.1379 
Number of fixed effects 23 23 23 23 
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We estimate the impact of land use type on both the Gini coefficient of distribution at the ejido-level 
and the yearly payment amount received by each eijdatario at the household-level. Our econometric 
results suggest that the more prevalent cattle ranching is in the ejido, the more unequal the 
distribution tends to be. Moreover, within the same ejido, the ejidatarios that conserved the forest in 
the past receive higher payments whilst the cattle-ranchers, receive less remuneration than their peer-
ejidatarios. Most payments are allocated to the agents that obtain a lower part of their income by 
exploiting the common forests. Cattle ranchers receive less payment either because they decided to 
remain outside of the program or because they already cleared their share of commons. The final 
allocation of the PSA-H reflects mainly past trajectories and the agents that deforested in the past 
tend to receive fewer payments. 
This study highlights the difficulty to involve the land users willing to deforest in the process, 
especially within common lands. In our study, cattle ranchers may have remained outside simply 
because they cleared most of their share of commons or because they considered that payments  were 
too low. It is also very likely that they currently regard environmental programs as a threat more than 
as an opportunity. 
PES schemes as compensation mechanisms are exceptions to the polluter-pays principle (Pirard 
et al. 2010). The idea that payments should be directed to the agents that deforest is far from being 
appropriated by forest owners or all intermediaries involved from the federal-level to the ejidos. The 
ejidos may have reinterpreted the program's objectives according to their own conception of fairness 
and consider that the program is primarily targeted toward the agents that already conserve the forest 
as a reward for greener behavior (Pascual et al., 2010). This would explain why cattle-ranchers are 
excluded from the process. 
Once confronted with reality, PES can result in unexpected outcome and our study confirms the 
difficulty to design a national PES scheme targeted toward the agents that deforest. When dealing 
with commons, it seems ethically impossible to compensate income loss within a community 
without rewarding those already conserving the forest. It may not be a problem if, on the long-run, 
PES impulses a change of behavior by the agents that deforest. Nevertheless, more effort is needed 
to include the forest users in a process that they currently regard as a threat to their activity.  
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Appendix 
Table 5. Variables description at ejido-level 
 
Variable Description 
mec05 ejid Presence of mechanised agriculture in the ejido in 2005 (Dummy variable) 
trad05_ejid Presence of traditional agriculture in the ejido in 2005 (Dummy variable) 
ranch05_ejid Presence of cattle-ranching in the ejido in 2005 (Dummy variable) 
per_trad05 Percentage of ejidatarios with traditional agriculture in the ejido in 2005 
per_mec05 Percentage of ejidatarios with mechanised agriculture in the ejido in 2005 
per ranch05  Percentage of ejidatarios with cattle ranching in the ejido in 2005 
Ejidatarios Number of ejidatarios 
Forest 2005 Total superficies of forests in the ejido in 2005 
Assembly 
participation 
Average participation rate at the assembly 
% Commons Percentage of common land within the ejido 
Labour-ejido Labour-ejido (dummy variable) 
 
 
Table 6. Variables description at household-level 
Variable Description 
mec05 hh Ejidatarios with mechanised agriculture in 2005 (Dummy variable) 
trad05 hh Ejidatarios with traditional agriculture in 2005 (Dummy variable) 
ranch05_hh Ejidatarios with cattle ranching in 2005 (Dummy variable) 
Off-farm in 2005 Ejidatarios with permanent off-farm activities in 2005 (Dummy variable)  
Asset index in 2005 Size of the household in 2005 
Asset index in 2005 Assets of the household in 2005 
Ejido’s authorities Involvement in the ejidos ’ authorities (Dummy variable)  
Producer 
organization 
Involvement in a producer organization(Dummy variable) 
 
 
 
 
 
